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Abstract—In this paper, we analyze pilot contamination (PC)
attacks on a multi-cell massive multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) network with correlated pilots. We obtain correlated
pilots using a user capacity-achieving pilot sequence design.
This design relies on an algorithm which designs correlated
pilot sequences based on signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) requirements for all the legitimate users. The pilot design
is capable of achieving the SINR requirements for all users
even in the presence of PC. However, this design has some
intrinsic limitations and vulnerabilities, such as a known pilot
sequence and the non-zero cross-correlation among different pilot
sequences. We reveal that such vulnerabilities may be exploited
by an active attacker to increase PC in the network. Motivated by
this, we analyze the correlated pilot design for vulnerabilities that
can be exploited by an active attacker. Based on this analysis, we
develop an effective active attack strategy in the massive MIMO
network with correlated pilot sequences. Our examinations reveal
that the user capacity region of the network is significantly
reduced in the presence of the active attack. Importantly, the
SINR requirements for the worst-affected users may not be
satisfied even with an infinite number of antennas at the base
station.
Index Terms—Pilot contamination, active attack, correlated
pilots, physical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
MASSIVE multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) hasbeen widely acknowledged as an essential enabler for
the next-generation wireless networks. In massive MIMO
networks, base stations (BSs) are equipped with a huge number
of antennas to offer numerous benefits over regular MIMO,
such as simpler power control [2], higher spectral efficiency,
and higher energy efficiency [3], [4]. A key benefit of massive
MIMO is that the wireless channels become increasingly
orthogonal when the number of antennas at BS increases [5].
Thus, recent experimental results have suggested that massive
MIMO offers a major improvement in performance towards
achieving a thousand time increased data rate as compared to
the 4G networks, which confirms the important role of massive
MIMO in the 5G era [6]–[8].
Pilot contamination (PC) is one of the key performance
limiting factors for unlocking the full potential offered by
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massive MIMO [9]–[13]. PC stems from the reuse of pilot
sequences in the massive MIMO network. Consequently, the
pilot sequences assigned to different users in the network
are non-orthogonal [11], [12]. We highlight that the next-
generation wireless networks are required to support a large
number of high-mobility users. As such, it is not possible
to assign orthogonal pilot sequences to all the users in the
network. Also, the short duration of the channel coherence
interval restricts the use of a large number of orthogonal pilot
sequences in the massive MIMO network. Consequently, there
are limited orthogonal pilot sequences available in massive
MIMO networks.
Considering the fact that PC degrades the performance of
the massive MIMO network, a number of solutions have
been proposed to compensate for this degradation [9], [14].
Such solutions can be broadly grouped into five categories:
1) the protocol-based method which restricts the simultaneous
transmission from the users having the same pilot sequence
or wisely assigns pilot sequences among users to alleviate
PC [15]–[17]; 2) the precoding-based method which relies
on specifically designed precoders to reduce the interference
caused by PC [10], [18]; 3) the angle-of-arrival (AoA)-based
method which mitigates the interference from the users having
the same pilot sequence and mutually non-overlapping AoAs
[19], [20]; 4) the blind method which partitions the signal
space into desired signal subspace and interference signal sub-
space and then develops algorithms to reduce the interference
from the latter [21], [22]; and 5) the pilot sequence design
methods which aim at designing pilot sequences such that the
PC does not severely impacts the network performance [11]–
[13]. It is worth mentioning that most conventional methods
assumed orthogonal pilot sequences to perform PC analysis
[10], [15], [19], [20]. However, this assumption may not be
practical in realistic massive MIMO networks. Fortunately,
pilot sequence design methods relax the assumption of strict
orthogonality between the pilot sequence set [11]–[13]. As
such, the pilot sequences set is non-orthogonal and every pilot
sequence has a non-zero cross-correlation with other pilot
sequences. Accordingly, the pilot sequence design methods
aim at minimizing the cross-correlation such that the network
achieves its performance target, e.g., signal-to-interference-
plus-noise ratio (SINR) requirements. Although pilot sequence
design methods provide an adequate solution to the PC prob-
lem, the use of correlated pilots makes the massive MIMO
network more susceptible to PC attacks by an adversary [1].
We highlight that PC attack may be difficult to detect in a
massive MIMO network [23], [24]. Recently, several methods
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have been proposed for PC attack detection [25]–[27]. PC
attacks can be detected using self-contamination [25], [26]
or via random channel training [27]. If an attacker avoids
detection and countermeasures, it may successfully modify the
downlink precorder at BSs for legitimate users with PC attack
[24]. Different from [24], we consider a network with multiple
Bobs and Eves. Furthermore, we analyze the optimal pilot
selection at Eves for PC attack when the pilot sequences used
in the network are correlated. As such, the results, analysis,
and discussions in this manuscript cannot be obtained directly
from [24]. Notably, it is possible to increase the adversity of
PC attack with multiple Eves [28]. As such, PC attack has
large potential to severely degrade the performance of massive
MIMO networks.
In this paper, we analyze the user capacity-achieving pilot
sequence design from the perspective of an active attacker.
We highlight that the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence
design method composes correlated pilots for all the users
in the network [11]–[13]. The user capacity-achieving pilot
sequence design determines the user capacity region of the
network under PC, where the user capacity-region signifies
the range for the SINR requirements that can be satisfied by
using the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence design. This
design also recommends a downlink power allocation method
to minimize the interference between different users in the
network. The major advantage of using the user capacity-
achieving pilot sequence design is that it can satisfy a diverse
range of SINR requirement for all the users in the network as
long as the SINR requirements lie inside the user capacity
region of the massive MIMO network. In this paper, we
demonstrate the vulnerabilities in the user capacity-achieving
pilot sequence design. As such, an active attacker with limited
knowledge about the network configuration and parameters
can successfully reduce the achievable SINR of the users in
the network such that they may no longer be satisfied with the
user capacity-achieving pilot sequence design. Furthermore,
we propose an active attacking strategy for increasing PC in
the network. Additionally, we demonstrate the limitations of
using correlated pilots and reveal that the use of correlated
pilots makes a network prone to active attacks. To this end, we
analyze the network performance under the active PC attack.
The major contributions and novelty of this work are
summarized as follows:
• We analyze and identify the limitations of using corre-
lated pilots in a multiuser massive MIMO network where
the correlated pilots are designed using the user capacity-
achieving pilot sequence design [11]–[13]. To this end,
we first derive analytical expressions to demonstrate the
reduction in the user capacity region in a massive MIMO
network under PC attack. We then demonstrate that the
SINR requirements for all the users in the network can
no longer be satisfied with the user capacity-achieving
pilot sequence design in a network under PC attack.
• We propose a PC attack strategy on the user capacity-
achieving pilot sequence design in the considered mul-
tiuser massive MIMO network. We show that the user
capacity region achieved by the user capacity-achieving
pilot sequence design is significantly reduced by the PC
Fig. 1. Illustration of a multi-cell massive MIMO network with active
attackers.
attack. Thus, a diverse range of SINR requirements for
users are no longer supported. Importantly, the SINR
requirements for some users cannot be guaranteed even
with an infinite number of antennas at the BS in the
network under PC attack.
• We analyze the structure of pilot sequences designed
by the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence design.
We demonstrate that the structure of the pilot sequences
provides useful information to an active attacker, which
can then be exploited for a PC attack.
We present numerical results to demonstrate the impact
of PC attack under varying network parameters. Our numer-
ical results demonstrate that PC attack reduces the SINR
requirements for some users such that they can no longer be
satisfied even with an unlimited number of antennas at the BS.
Furthermore, the PC attack reduces the SINR for other users
such that additional antennas are required at the BS to fulfill
their SINR requirements during the downlink transmission
phase.
Notations: Vectors and matrices are denoted by lower-case
and upper-case boldface symbols, respectively. (·)T denotes
the transpose, (·)H denotes the Hermitian transpose, ⊗ de-
notes the Kronecker product, E[·] denotes the mathematical
expectation, ‖ · ‖ denotes the l2 norm, tr(·) denotes the trace
operation, and var(·) denotes the variance operation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a multi-cell massive MIMO network consisting
of L cells with N single-antenna active attackers in each
cell, denoted by Eves. Each cell consists of an M -antenna
array BS, denoted by Alice, and K legitimate single-antenna
users, denoted by Bobs. We assume that the channels between
various nodes (i.e., Alice, Bobs, and Eves) encounter both
small-scale and large-scale propagation effects. We express
the channel between the j-th legitimate user in the i-th cell,
Bobij and Alice in the l-th cell, Alicel, as gijl =
√
βijlhijl,
where i ∈ {1, · · · , L}, j ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, and l ∈ {1, · · · , L}.
Here, we denote the small-scale propagation vector between
Alicel and Bobij by hijl = [hijl1, . . . , hijlm, . . . , hijlM ],
the elements of which are Rayleigh distributed small-scale
propagation coefficients with zero mean and unit variance,
AKBAR et al.:ON THE PILOT CONTAMINATION ATTACK IN MULTI-CELL MULTIUSER MASSIVE MIMO NETWORKS 3
i.e., hijlm ∼ CN (0, 1). We denote the distance-dependent
large-scale propagation coefficient between Bobij and Alicl
by βijl. Similarly, the channel between Alicel and the n-th
Eve in the i-th cell, Evein, is expressed as g¯inl =
√
β¯inlh¯inl,
where n ∈ {1, · · · , N} and β¯inl and h¯inl denote the distance-
dependent large-scale propagation coefficient and small-scale
propagation vector between Alicel and Evein, respectively.
Additionally, we assume that the number of Bobs in the
network is greater than the length of the pilot sequences, i.e.,
K > τ . As such, both the intra-cell and the inter-cell PC exists
in the network [13], [29], [30].
The communication between Bobs and Alice consists of
two phases: (i) the uplink channel estimation from Bobs
to Alice and (ii) the downlink transmission from Alice to
Bobs. In the uplink channel estimation phase, Bobs send
their pre-assigned pilot sequences to the same-cell Alice for
channel estimation. We assume that the network operates in the
time division duplex (TDD) mode, indicating that the uplink
and the downlink channels are assumed to be reciprocal. As
such, the uplink channels and the downlink channels remain
the same during a channel coherence interval. Based on the
assumption of channel reciprocity, Alice utilizes the uplink
channel estimates in the downlink transmission phase [31].
A. Uplink Channel Estimation Under Pilot Contamination
Attack
We now examine the impact of PC attack on the uplink
channel estimation phase. In this phase, Alicel obtains the
uplink channel estimates with the aid of the pilot sequences
transmitted from Bobs in the same cell. At the beginning of
each channel coherence interval, Bobs send their pre-assigned
pilot sequences to Alicel. We consider that Evein has some
knowledge of the pilot sequences used in the network. As
such, Evein transmits a pilot sequence s¯in during the uplink
channel estimation phase such that the correlation between s¯in
and sij is non-zero, where sij is the pilot sequence assigned to
Bobij .1 The uplink pilot transmission vector received at Alicel
in the presence of N Eves is represented as
y¯l=
L∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
√
pijβijlSijhijl+
L∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
√
p¯inβ¯inlS¯inh¯inl+z,
(1)
where pij denotes the pilot transmit power at Bobij , Sij =
sij ⊗ IM denotes the pilot sequence matrix for Bobij , p¯in
is the transmit power at Evein, S¯in = s¯in ⊗ IM is the pilot
sequence matrix for Evein, and z denotes the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) at Alicel with zero mean and variance
of σz , i.e., each element of z follows CN (0, σz). We assume
that the pilot sequences assigned to different Bobs in the
network are correlated. Specifically, the correlation between
pilot sequences assigned to Bobij and Boblk is given by
ρijlk = s
T
lksij . Afterwards, Alicel obtains the least-square
(LS) channel estimate of the channel from Boblk to Alicel
1We highlight that in the absence of the prior knowledge about pilot
sequences, Evein can transmit a random pilot sequence, which is considered
as a jamming attack in the massive MIMO network [32], [33].
by multiplying (1) with the pilot sequence matrix Sij as [4],
[11], [13].
ˆ¯hlkl =
√
plkβlklhlkl +
L∑
i=1
(i,j)6=
K∑
j=1
(l,k)
√
pijβijlρijlkhijl
+
L∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
√
p¯inβ¯inlρinlkh¯inl + z, (2)
where ρinlk = sTlks¯in. We note that when K > τ , we have
ρijlk 6= 0 2. Consequently, the second term on the right-hand
side (RHS) of (2) exists due to the use of correlated pilots
assigned to different Bobs in the network. We highlight that
the third term on the RHS of (2) exists due to Eves’ PC attack,
which degrades the quality of channel estimates obtained by
Alicel. Since N = 0 indicates no PC attack, the third term
on the RHS of (2) disappears when N = 0. When N 6= 0,
the third term is always positive and PC attack reduces the
channel estimation accuracy.
We note from (2) that the increase in PC depends on the
strength of the interference caused by Evein, which can be
controlled through adjusting p¯in, β¯in, and ρinlk. However,
increasing the pilot transmit power, i.e., p¯in, also increases the
chances that the PC attack is detected by Alicel. Additionally,
we highlight that β¯in depends on the distance between Alicel
and Evein. To increase β¯in, Evein needs to move closer to
Alicel, which may not be possible due to mobility restrictions
for Evein, as moving closer to Alicel will make Evein more
prone to detection. We clarify that by carefully selecting the
pilot sequence for the PC attack, Evein can increase ρinlk
without compromising its own privacy. We will discuss the
selection of pilot sequences for the PC attack in Section VI.
B. Downlink Transmission and SINR Under Pilot Contamina-
tion Attack
In this subsection, we determine the downlink achievable
SINR at Boblk in the downlink transmission phase where
Alicel sends data symbols to Bobs in the same cell. Based on
the assumption of channel reciprocity in the TDD mode, Alicel
uses the uplink channel estimates obtained via the uplink
channel training, i.e., the channel estimates contaminated by
Eves given by (2), for the downlink transmission. We denote
the symbols intended for Boblk by xlk and assume that Alicel
transmits xlk using the transmit power Plk, where Plk =
E
[
xHlkxlk
]
. Assuming that Alicel performs maximum-ratio-
transmission (MRT) using the channel estimates contaminated
by Eves, the precoding vector t¯lk for Boblk under PC attack
is given by
t¯lk =
1√
Mα¯lk
ˆ¯hlkl, (3)
where
α¯lk =
L∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
pijβijl |ρijlk|2 +
L∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
p¯inβ¯inl |ρinlk|2 + σ2z .
(4)
2We highlight that utilizing uncorrelated pilot sequences during the uplink
transmission phase, i.e., τ = K, is a specific case of (2), where ρijlk = 1
for j = k and ρijlk = 0 for j 6= k.
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We note that the second term on the RHS of (4) is caused by
Eves’ PC attack. Thus, Eves modify the precoder for Boblk
by contaminating the channel estimates such that the downlink
achievable SINR for Boblk is lower than that without the PC
attack.
Next, Alicel multiplies xlk with t¯lk for the downlink
transmission. Therefore, the downlink signal received at Boblk
is written as
ˆ¯rlk =
L∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
√
βlkih
H
lki (t¯ijxij) + w, (5)
where w is the AWGN at Boblk. Assuming that Boblk only
has statistical information about its channel hlkl, we express
the downlink signal received at Boblk as
ˆ¯rlk =
√
βlklE
[
hHlklt¯lk
]
xlk +
√
βlkl
(
hHlklt¯lk − E
[
hHlklt¯lk
])
xlk
+
∑
(i,j)6=(l,k)
√
βlkih
H
lki (t¯ijxij) + w. (6)
Noting that the first term on the RHS of (6) is independent and
uncorrelated with the remaining terms, the downlink SINR at
Boblk is written as
θ¯lk,M =
∣∣E [hHlklt¯lk]∣∣2 βlklPlk
var
[
hHlklt¯lk
]
βlklPlk + ζlki + σ2w
, (7)
where we define ζlki =
∑
(i,j) 6=(l,k) E[|hHlkit¯ij |2]βlkiPij . Af-
terwards, (7) can be written in closed-from as [11], [13]
θ¯lk,M =
βlklPlk
α¯lk
(∑
(i,j) 6=(l,k)
|ρlkij |2Ξ2lkiβlkiPij
α¯ij
)
+ α¯lkM (Ptot)
,
(8)
where Ξ2lki = plkβlki and Ptot =
∑L
i=1
∑K
j=1 βlkiPij + σ
2
w.
We highlight that (8) is valid for an arbitrary number of
antennas at the BS and an arbitrary number of Eves in the
network. Notably, (8) is also valid for the network having no
Eve, i.e., N = 0. For this network, we obtain the downlink
achievable SINR at Boblk as
θlk,M =
βlklPlk
αlk
(∑
(i,j) 6=(l,k)
|ρlkij |2Ξ2lkiβlkiPij
αij
)
+ αlkM (Ptot)
,
(9)
where
αlk =
L∑
i=1
K∑
j=1
pijβijl |ρijlk|2 + σ2z . (10)
Comparing (4) with (10), we note that utilizing the precoding
vector contaminated by Eves results in an increased interfer-
ence at Boblk during the downlink data transmission phase.
Remark 1: By comparing (8) with (9), we observe that Eves
are able to degrade the SINR at Boblk with the PC attack.
Importantly, the correlation parameter with Eves, given by
(4), is greater than correlation parameter without Eve, given
by (10), i.e., α¯lk > αlk. As a result, it is expected that the
downlink SINR with Eves is smaller than that without Eves,
i.e., θ¯lk,M < θlk,M .
III. USER CAPACITY IN MASSIVE MIMO NETWORKS
UNDER PILOT CONTAMINATION ATTACK
In this section, we examine the impact of the PC attack on
the user capacity of the considered massive MIMO network.
Here, we define the user capacity as the bound on the number
of Bobs that can be simultaneously served via the downlink
of the network such that the SINR requirement for all Bobs
can be satisfied.
We assume that the SINR requirement for Boblk is γlk.
Also, we assume that the downlink achievable SINR at Boblk
needs to be higher than the SINR requirement γlk for success-
ful downlink transmission, i.e, θ¯lk,M ≥ γlk for M antennas
at Alicel. We present the bound on the user capacity of the
network in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: For a multi-cell multiuser massive MIMO
network under PC attack, where the transmit power of Evein
is p¯in > 0 during the uplink transmission phase, the bound
on the total number of Bobs, Ktot, that can be simultaneously
served via the downlink transmission is given by
Ktot ≤
[(
τ
LN + 1
) L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
(
1 + γlk
γlk
)] 12
, (11)
where Ktot = LK and γlk1+γlk is the effective bandwidth of
Boblk.
Proof: The proof is presented in Appendix A.
We note that the bound on the user capacity given in
(11) is a generalized expression and valid for any pilot
sequence design. However, not every pilot design is capable of
achieving the bound in (11) with equality [11], [13]. For most
pilot designs, (11) is satisfied without equality, i.e., Ktot <[(
τ
LN+1
)∑L
l=1
∑K
k=1
(
1+γlk
γlk
)] 1
2
. As such, different pilot
designs are capable of supporting different numbers of Bobs
in the network. We highlight that a carefully designed pilot
sequence, such as the use capacity-achieving pilot design [11],
[13], is capable of achieving the bound on the user capacity
with equality, i.e., Ktot =
[(
τ
LN+1
)∑L
l=1
∑K
k=1
(
1+γlk
γlk
)] 1
2
.
As such, the user capacity-achieving pilot design can satisfy
a diverse range of SINR requirements for various Bobs in the
network.
Proposition 2: The bound on the user capacity given by (11)
with N Eves in each cell of the network holds when the sum
of effective bandwidths of all Bobs in the network is less than
or equal to the ratio between the length of the pilot sequence
and (LN + 1). We express this condition as
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
γlk
1 + γlk
≤ τ
LN + 1
. (12)
Proof: Utilizing the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we ob-
tain
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
1 + γlk
γlk
≥ K
2
tot∑L
l=1
∑K
k=1
γlk
1+γlk
. (13)
Using (12), we simplify (13) as
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
1 + γlk
γlk
≥ K
2
tot (LN + 1)
τ
. (14)
AKBAR et al.:ON THE PILOT CONTAMINATION ATTACK IN MULTI-CELL MULTIUSER MASSIVE MIMO NETWORKS 5
TABLE I
LIST OF IMPORTANT FORMULAS
Without PC Attack N = 0 With PC Attack N > 0
Channel Estimates hˆlkl =
∑L
i=1
∑K
j=1
√
pijβijlρijlkhijl + z
ˆ¯hlkl =
∑L
i=1
∑K
j=1
√
pijβijlρijlkhijl +
∑L
i=1
∑N
n=1
√
p¯inβ¯inlρinlkh¯inl + z (2)
Correlation Parameter αlk =
∑L
i=1
∑K
j=1 pijβijl
∣∣ρijlk∣∣2 + σ2z α¯lk = ∑Li=1∑Kj=1 pijβijl ∣∣ρijlk∣∣2 +∑Li=1∑Nn=1 p¯inβ¯inl |ρinlk|2 + σ2z (4)
Precoding Vector tlk = 1√
Mαlk
hˆlkl t¯lk =
1√
Mα¯lk
ˆ¯hlkl (3)
Downlink SINR θlk,M =
|E[hHlkltlk]|2βlklPlk
var[hHlkltlk]βlklPlk+
∑
(i,j)6=(l,k) E[|hHlkitij |2]βlkiPij+σ2w
θ¯lk,M =
|E[hHlkl t¯lk]|2βlklPlk
var[hHlkl t¯lk]βlklPlk+
∑
(i,j)6=(l,k) E[|hHlki t¯ij |2]βlkiPij+σ2w
(7)
Downlink SINR (closed-form) θlk,M =
βlklPlk
αlk
(∑K
(i,j)6=(l,k)
|ρlkij |2Ξ2lkiβlkiPij
αij
)
+
αlk
M
(∑L
i=1
∑K
j=1 βlkiPij+σ
2
w
) θ¯lk,M = βlklPlk
α¯lk
(∑K
(i,j)6=(l,k)
|ρlkij |2Ξ2lkiβlkiPij
α¯ij
)
+
α¯lk
M
(∑L
i=1
∑K
j=1 βlkiPij+σ
2
w
) (9)
Downlink User Capacity Region
∑L
l=1
∑K
k=1
γlk
1+γlk
≤ τ ∑Ll=1∑Kk=1 γlk1+γlk ≤ τLN+1 (12)
We next simplify the expression (14) to obtain (11), which
completes the proof.
From (11), we note that the bound on the user capacity
of the network without Eves is a special case of (11) when
N = 0. Specifically, the bound on the user capacity region of
the massive MIMO network without Eves is obtained as
Ktot ≤
(
τ
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
1 + γlk
γlk
) 1
2
. (15)
Furthermore, the user capacity given in (15) is satisfied when
the sum of the effective bandwidths of all Bobs in the network
are less than or equal to the length of the pilot sequence [11].
This condition is expressed as
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
γlk
1 + γlk
≤ τ. (16)
We note that the bound in (16) specifies the user capacity
region of the network without Eves. Notably, the bound on
the user capacity in (15) is satisfied as long as the bound
on the user capacity region in (16) holds. For a given user
capacity and user capacity region, it is possible to design pilot
sequences for all Bobs in the network such that the Bobs’
SINR requirements are satisfied with a limited number of
antennas at Alice [11]–[13]. We refer to this pilot sequence
design as the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence design.
We further refer to the designed pilot sequences as user
capacity-achieving pilot sequences.
Remark 2: Comparing (12) and (16), we note that the user
capacity region is significantly reduced in the presence of the
PC attack. The reduction in the user capacity region depends
on the number of Eves, N , in the network.
Table I provides a summary of important formulas in
Section. II and Section. III. We highlight that the network
without the PC attack is a special case of a network with the
PC attack for N = 0.
IV. CAPACITY-ACHIEVING PILOT SEQUENCE DESIGN AND
POWER ALLOCATION
In this section, we present the algorithm for the user
capacity-achieving pilot sequence design. The algorithm de-
signs pilot sequences such that the SINR requirements for all
Bobs in the network are satisfied. We assume that the pilot
sequences are designed by Alicel based on the individual
SINR requirements for Bobs in the same cell. These pilot
sequences are then used by Bobs during the uplink channel
estimation phase. We assume that each Bob has a minimum
SINR requirement for the downlink transmission, i.e., Boblk
has the minimum SINR requirement of γlk. The goal of the
user capacity-achieving pilot design is to generate correlated
pilots such that θlk,M is greater than or equal to γlk. We next
detail the pilot sequence design process.
A. Pilot Sequence Design at Alice
1) Computation of Effective Bandwidths: We assume that
Alicel knows the SINR requirements for all Bobs in the l-
th cell. We represent the SINR requirement for all Bobs
in the l-th cell by a vector b = [γl1, γl2, . . . , γlK ], where
γl1 ≥ γl2 ≥ · · · ≥ γlK . Based on the information of
b, Alice calculates the effective bandwidths for all Bobs as
b¯ = [γl1/(1 + γl1), γl2/(1 + γl2), · · · , γlK/(1 + γlK)]. We
note that the SINR requirements must be chosen to achieve the
bound on the user capacity region given in (16). We highlight
that it is desirable to achieve (16) with equality such that the
benefits of a lager user capacity region are fully utilized [11].
As such, Alice modifies b¯ as bˆ = [bˆ1, bˆ2, · · · , bˆK ], where
bˆk = γˆlk/(1 + γˆlk) and
∑K
k=1 bˆk = τ . We highlight that the
SINR modification needs to be carefully carried out such that
they remain inside the user capacity region.
2) Majorization and T-Transform: In this step, Alicel aims
to find a vector x = [x1, · · · , xτ , 0, · · · , 0] that majorizes bˆ,
i.e., x  bˆ. We highlight that x is easily obtained from bˆ
when xp = 1τ
∑K
k=1 bˆk = 1, where p ∈ {1, · · · , τ} and xq =
0, where q ∈ {τ + 1, · · · ,K}. Given x, bˆ is obtainable by
applying at most K−1 T-transform operations [34] on x, i.e.,
bˆ = TK−1TK−2 · · ·T1x, and there exists a matrix W =
W1W2 · · ·WK−1, where Wk is a unitary matrix, which is
generated from Tk at each step of the T-transform [11], [34],
[35].
3) Generation of User Capacity-Achieving Pilot Sequences:
In this step, Alicel generates pilot sequences for all Bobs in
the l-th cell based on x, bˆ and W. Alicel obtains a matrix
V from W, where V contains only the first τ rows from W.
Afterwards, Alicel obtains the pilot sequence for all Bobs in
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the l-th cell as
Sl = normc
(
B
1
2 VZ−
1
2
)
, (17)
where B =
∑K
k=1 bˆk and Z = diag
(
bˆ
)
. We note that each
column of Sl represents the pilot sequence vector for one
Bob in the l-th cell. Specifically, Sl = [sl1, · · · , slk, · · · , slK ].
We highlight that the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence
design method is based on the principles of generalized Welch
bound equality sequences used in code-division multiple ac-
cess systems [36].
B. Downlink Power Allocation at Alice
During the downlink data transmission phase, Alicel care-
fully chooses the downlink transmission power with the aim
to satisfy the SINR requirers for all Bobs in the l-th cell.
Specifically, Alicel allocates the downlink power for Boblk as
[11], [13]
Plk = c
γˆlk
1 + γˆlk
, (18)
where c > 0 is a constant power-scaling factor. Moreover, [11]
proposed a specific power allocation scheme where the power-
scaling factor for Plk is chosen as c = αlk. When c = αlk
is used for Boblk, the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence
design satisfies the SINR requirements of all the Bobs in the
network, where there is no pilot contamination attack, i.e.,
N = 0 [11]. We highlight that when the power allocation
scheme is used with the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence
design, it is possible to achieve the SINR requirements for all
Bobs in the network provided that the SINR requirements lie
inside the user capacity region [11], [13].
Remark 3: We note that Alicel can design a valid pilot
sequence set as long as the SINR requirements lie inside the
user capacity region. However, when N is large, the area under
the user capacity region is small. Consequently, even if Alicel
is aware of the PC attack, it may not be possible for Alicel
to design pilot sequences to satisfy the SINR requirements for
all Bobs in the l-th cell when N is large.
V. VULNERABILITIES IN USER CAPACITY-ACHIEVING
PILOT SEQUENCE DESIGN
In this section, we identify the potential vulnerabilities in the
user capacity-achieving pilot sequence design. Specifically, we
highlight that these vulnerabilities make the massive MIMO
network prone to PC attack.
A. Structure of Pilot Sequence Set
We note that the pilot sequence for at least one Bob in each
cell is the same, regardless of the SINR requirements for all
Bobs in the network. This limitation stems from the design
of the user capacity-achieving pilot method. We highlight
that the pilot sequence for at least one Bob in each cell is
[1, 0, · · · , 0, 0]T , where the pilot sequence is a column vector
with length τ . As such, based on the knowledge that the
user capacity-achieving pilot design is used in the network,
Eves knows the pilot sequence for at least one Bob per cell.
Consequently, it is logical for Eves to transmit [1, 0, · · · , 0, 0]T
for the PC attack in the network where the pilot sequences are
obtained by using the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence
design.
B. SINR Modification in User Capacity-Achieving Pilot De-
sign
We highlight that the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence
design modifies the SINR requirements for all Bobs by choos-
ing γˆlk ≥ γlk. The SINR modification is performed such that
the SINR requirements lie on the upper surface boundary of
the user capacity region, i.e,
∑L
l=1
∑K
k=1
γˆlk
1+γˆlk
= τLN+1 . We
note that this SINR modification in the user capacity-achieving
pilot sequence design makes the network more prone to PC
attack. Moreover, it is possible that the SINR requirements
may lie outside the user capacity region in the presence of
the PC attack. We highlight that the user capacity-achieving
pilot sequence design is undefined for the area outside the
user capacity region. As such, the pilot sequence design no
longer guarantees that the SINR requirements for all the users
are satisfied when they lie outside the user capacity region.
Furthermore, we observe from (12) that the user capacity
region is significantly reduced in the presence of even a single
active attacker. Importantly, the SINR requirements may lie
outside the user capacity region in a network under the PC
attack, which undermines the benefits of the user capacity-
achieving pilot sequence design.
C. Correlated Pilots
The pilot sequences designed by the user capacity-achieving
pilot sequence design are correlated, i.e., ρijlk 6= 0. The user
capacity-achieving pilot sequence design aim at controlling
the cross-correlation between pilot sequences to manage PC.
However, due to the use of correlated pilots, the PC attack by
using the known pilot sequences identified in Sec. V-A can
potentially contaminate the channel estimates for Bobs with
the pilot sequences unknown to Eves.
VI. PILOT CONTAMINATION ATTACK STRATEGY ADOPTED
BY EVES
In this section, we outline a simple yet effective PC attack
strategy. We assume that Eves has limited knowledge about
the network. However, we note that Eves need to know
two network parameters for successfully exploiting the user
capacity-achieving pilot sequence design, i.e., the length of
pilot sequence and the information that user capacity-achieving
pilot design is used in the network. We highlight that these
parameters are easy to obtain in any network. Throughout this
paper, we assume that Eves have knowledge of these network
parameters before the uplink channel training phase.
A. Attacking Aims of Eves
As active attackers, Eves aim to disturb the functioning of
the network. Specifically, Eves aims to:
1) Exploit the vulnerabilities in the user capacity-achieving
pilot sequence design to increase PC in the uplink
channel estimates;
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2) Degrade the achievable SINR of the user with known
pilot sequence, i.e., Boblk, such that the SINR target for
Boblk cannot be satisfied even with an unlimited number
of antennas at Alicel;
3) Deteriorate the achievable SINR for users with unknown
pilot sequence such that their respective SINR targets are
no longer satisfied with the pre-determined number of
antennas at the Alicel.
We recall from (1) that the Evein has some degree of control
over three parameters, i.e., p¯in, β¯inl, and S¯in. We next detail
each parameter in the following subsections.
B. Transmit Power p¯in at Evein During Uplink Training
During the uplink channel estimation phase, Evein transmits
the pilot sequence with the transmit power p¯in. Furthermore,
Evein can transmit with a small non-zero transmit power to
avoid being detected. We note that Evein can increase PC in
the channel estimates at Alicel by increasing p¯in. We also note
that the increase in p¯in increases the probability of detection of
Evein by Alicel. As such, we make a reasonable assumption
that p¯in cannot be greater than the highest transmit power
amongst all Bobs in the l-th cell in the network network
during the uplink channel estimation phase. We represent this
condition as
0 < p¯in ≤ max {plk} , where k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. (19)
C. Locations of Eves
We note that the location of Evein is important in the
success of the PC attack. We highlight that the large-scale
propagation coefficient β¯inl is a distance-dependent parameter.
As such, an Eve can locate itself close to the BS to increase
PC. However, the mobility of Eves may not be practical in
order to avoid detection by the BS. Additionally, the BS may
perform a simple inverse-power control to mitigate the effect
of the large-scale propagation coefficient. The inverse-power
control is applied such that plkβlkl = 1. As such, there is
an additional constraint on the pilot transmit power of Evein,
given by
p¯inβ¯inl ≤ 1. (20)
This condition ensures that the PC power from Evein received
at Alicel does not exceed the power received from Bobs during
the uplink channel estimation phase.
D. Pilot Sequence Transmitted by Eves
In this subsection, we present the optimal pilot sequence
adopted at Evein for the PC attack on Boblk. Moreover, we
examine the impact of Eves’ PC attack on the uplink channel
estimates of Bobs whose pilot sequences are not known to
Eves.
Proposition 3: For a multi-cell multiuser massive MIMO
network under PC attack, the optimal pilot sequences trans-
mitted by Evein to maximize the error variance between the
channel estimate for Boblk without the PC attack and the
channel estimate for Boblk with the PC attack are given by
s¯in = slk and s¯in = s∗lk, respectively.
Proof: From (2), we obtain the error between the channel
estimate for Boblk with no PC and the channel estimate for
Boblk with the PC attack as
ξlk =
ˆ¯hlkl − hˆlkl =
L∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
√
p¯inβ¯inlρinlkh¯inl, (21)
where hˆlkl is the channel estimate for Boblk without the PC
attack and is obtained from (2) when N = 0. We next obtain
the variance of ξlk from (21) as
var (ξlk) = E
[
ξHlkξlk
]
,
= E
[(
L∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
√
p¯inβ¯inlρinlkh¯
H
inl
)
× (22)(
L∑
p=1
N∑
q=1
√
p¯pqβ¯pqlρpqlkh¯pql
)]
,
=
L∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
p¯inβ¯inlρinlkE
[
h¯Hinlh¯inl
]
. (23)
We next utilize the channel hardening property of massive
MIMO, which is given by [11], [13]
lim
M→∞
1
M
hHijlhlkl =
{
1, ∀ (i, j) = (l, k)
0, otherwise,
(24)
to simplify (22) under the assumption that M →∞ as
var (Ξlk) = M
L∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
p¯inβ¯inl|ρinlk|2. (25)
Using (20) and (25), we obtain
var (Ξk) ≤M
L∑
i=1
N∑
n=1
|ρinlk|2. (26)
We recall that ρinlk = sTlks¯in, where the value of ρinlk
is between −1 and +1 for user capacity achieving pilot
sequence design. Also, we note that the maximum value of∑L
i=1
∑N
n=1 |ρinlk|2 is LN , which is achieved when s¯in = slk
or s¯in = s∗lk. From (26), we note that the maximum value
of var (Ξlk) is MLN , when all Eves transmit the known
pilot sequence. As such, var (Ξlk) is maximum when all Eves
transmit the same pilot sequence allocated to Boblk, which
completes the proof.
We highlight that maximizing error variance of the channel
estimates also impacts the downlink precoder. Alternatively,
it is possible to directly compute the pilot contamination
precoder through eigenvalue analysis of the correlation matrix
[37]. We next examine the impact of Eves’ PC attack using
the known pilot sequences on Bobs with the unknown pilot
sequences in the network in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: For a multi-cell multiuser massive MIMO net-
work under PC attack, where a non-orthogonal pilot sequence
set is used in the network, transmitting the known pilot
sequence by Eves contaminates the channel estimates of Bobs
with unknown pilot sequences.
Proof: We note that the channel estimates are contami-
nated when ρinlk 6= 0. Notably, when a non-orthogonal pilot
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sequence set is used in the network, ρinlk 6= 0 is achieved
for all Bobs in the network. Specifically, pilot designs, e.g.,
the user capacity-achieving sequence design, have a non-
zero cross-correlation for all Bobs. Consequently, we observe
from (26) that when Eves transmit the known pilot sequence
used by Boblk, we have var (Ξlk) = MLN . Furthermore,
var (Ξij) > 0, where (i, j) 6= (l, k) and ρijlk 6= 0. As
such, transmitting the known pilot sequences by Eves in a
network with correlated pilot sequences not only degrades the
performance of Bobs with known pilot sequences but degrades
the performance of Bobs with unknown pilot sequences.
E. Detection and Mitigation of PC Attack
In this subsection, we discuss the detection and mitigation
of PC attack from the perspective of Alicel. We highlight that
Evein utilizes the known vulnerabilities in the user capacity-
achieving pilot design for PC attack. As such, the target
user Boblk archives an SINR lower than the target γlk. To
detect the PC attack on Boblk, Alicel can request feedback
from Boblk on whether θlk ≥ γlk occurs in the previous
channel coherence interval. Based on the feedback from Boblk,
multiple unsuccessful transmissions in the downlink for Boblk
indicate a possible PC attack on Boblk. After detecting the
attack, Alicel can perform a reactive action and redesign the
pilot sequences for the l-th cell. As such, Boblk is assigned a
pilot sequence that is different from the one known to Evein.
This implies that Alicel can mitigate the impact of the PC
attack on Boblk by redesigning pilot sequences if the attack
is detected.
Another possible method for Alicel to mitigate the impact
of PC attack is to use a proactive approach in pilot sequence
design. For example, Alicel may anticipate the PC attack and
carefully design the pilot sequences for all Bobs in the l-th
cell. Importantly, Alicel may sacrifice the advantages offered
by a higher per-cell user capacity region by designing the pilot
sequences according to
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
γlk
1 + γlk
≤ τ − δl (27)
instead of (16), where δl is the factor indicating the anticipated
reduction in the per-cell user capacity region in the l-th cell
under the PC attack. Thus, the pilot sequences designed by
Alicel using (27) lie inside the per-cell user capacity region.
It follows that the SINR requirements for all the users in the
l-th cell are satisfied, even in the presence of the PC attack.
Furthermore, it is possible to detect and mitigate PC attack
by including a random training phase after the uplink training
phase [38].
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we numerically analyze the performance of
the massive MIMO network under the PC attack. We first
evaluate the impact of Eves on the user capacity region. Then,
we examine the impact of Eves on the achievable SINR when
Alicel is equipped with a large but limited number of antennas.
A summary of important simulation parameters is given in
Table II. Throughout this section, the simulation parameters
remain the same unless we specifically state otherwise.
TABLE II
A SUMMARY OF SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
L 2
K 4, except for Figs. 2, 3, and 5
τ 3, except for Fig. 2
SINR Requirements Fig. 2: [γl1, γl2, γl3, 1, 1]
Figs. 3 and 5: [γl1 = γl2 = . . . = γlK = γ]
Fig. 4: γ1 = [γ, γ, γ, ηγ], γ2 = [ηγ, ηγ, ηγ, ηγ]
Figs. 6, 7, and 8: γ1 = [0.91, 0.74, 0.64, 0.23]
γ2 = [0.94, 0.82, 0.45, 0.20]
p¯in 0 dB, except for Fig. 6
p¯lkβlkl 1 (due to uplink power control)
Plk αlk
(
γˆlk
1+γˆlk
)
Fig. 2. The reduction in the per-cell user capacity region in the massive
MIMO network under the PC attack for different number of Eves in a cell.
A. Impact of PC Attack on User Capacity Region
In this subsection, we examine the performance of the
network with a sufficiently large number of antennas at Alicel.
The results in this subsection are obtained from (12), which
represents the bound on the user capacity of the massive
MIMO network with N Eves.
We first demonstrate the reduction in the user capacity
region when the network is under the PC attack. The SINR
requirements for all Bobs in the massive MIMO network are
given by the vector [γl1, γl2, γl3, 1, 1]. Furthermore, we assume
K = 5 and τ = 3. Fig. 2 shows the upper surface boundary
of the per-cell user capacity region for different values of N .
Here, N = 0 indicates no Eves in the network. For the purpose
of visualization, we set γ13 = min{1, γ13}. We note that the
per-cell user capacity region is significantly reduced in the
presence of Eves. For example, when N = 1 and N = 2,
there is a 93% and 99% reduction in the area under the user
capacity region, respectively, as compared to N = 0. The
reduction in the user capacity region signifies that the network
is no longer capable of satisfying a diverse range of SINR
requirements when the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence
design is used in the network. Importantly, when N > 0, the
SINR requirements may lie outside the per-cell user capacity
region with N = 0. Since the pilot sequences are designed
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Fig. 3. The maximum achievable SINR versus the number of Eves in the
network for different number of Bobs in the network.
under the assumption of N = 0, the user capacity-achieving
pilot sequence design can no longer guarantee to satisfy the
SINR requirements for all Bobs in the network.
We next evaluate the impact of increasing the number of
Bobs K and Eves N on the maximum achievable SINR
of the massive MIMO network. In this simulation, we as-
sume that all Bobs have the same SINR requirements, i.e.,
γl1 = · · · = γlK = γ, where γ is the maximum achievable
SINR. Fig. 3 depicts the maximum achievable SINR versus
the number of Eves for different values of K. We note that
increasing N decreases the maximum achievable SINR in the
network, which signifies the impact of Eves on the network.
For example, when K = 4 and N increases from N = 0 to
N = 10, the maximum achievable SINR reduces from 1.0
to 0.03, which amounts to 97% reduction. We also note that
increasing K decreases the maximum achievable SINR in the
network. For example, when N = 0 and K increases from
K = 4 to K = 10, the maximum achievable SINR reduces
from 1.0 to 0.43, which is equivalent to 57% reduction in the
maximum achievable SINR. Furthermore, the user capacity-
achieving pilot sequence design is capable of designing pilot
sequences to satisfy the SINR requirement of all Bobs in a
cell or equivalently all Bobs in the network as long as the
SINR requirements remain inside the per-cell user capacity
region. As such, increasing N adversely affects the network
performance compared to increasing K.
We next examine the impact of increasing the maximum
achievable SINR requirements in the presence of N Eves
in the network. The SINR requirements in the network are
given by γ1 = [γ, γ, γ, ηγ] and γ2 = [ηγ, ηγ, ηγ, ηγ], where
η denotes a scaling factor applied to the SINR requirements
for a few Bobs. Fig. 4 shows the maximum achievable SINR
versus η for different values of N . We note that increasing
the SINR requirements in the network, i.e., increasing η,
decreases the maximum achievable SINR in the network. For
example, when N = 2 and η increases from 0.01 to 10,
the maximum achievable SINR decreases from 0.24 to 0.001,
which represents a 99% decrease. Moreoever, when η = 0.01
Fig. 4. The maximum achievable SINR versus η for different number of Eves
in the network.
Fig. 5. The maximum achievable SINR versus the pilot loading factor for
different number of Eves in the network.
and N increases from 0 to 10, the maximum achievable SINR
decreases from 1.0 to 0.05, which represents a 95% decrease.
We highlight that for η = 0.01, the increase in N from 0 to 2
means that the Bobs with SINR requirements above 0.04 can
no longer be satisfied using the user capacity-achieving pilot
sequence design.
We now evaluate the maximum achievable SINR against the
pilot loading factor 3, which is defined as the ratio between
the number of Bobs and the length of the pilot sequence,
i.e., K/τ . We highlight that pilot loading factor is a fair
parameter for performance evaluation since a higher pilot
loading factor represents a higher correlation between various
pilot sequences. In other words, the pilot sequences designed
by the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence design are less
orthogonal. Fig. 5 depicts the maximum achievable SINR
3In literature, pilot loading factor is used for the orthogonal pilot sequences.
A pilot loading factor of K/τ = 2 represents that two Bobs in a cell are
assigned the same pilot sequence.
10 ACCEPTED BY IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS
Fig. 6. The achievable SINR θ¯11,800 versus the transmit power of Even for
different number of Eves in the network.
versus the pilot loading factor for different values of N .
We note that increasing the pilot loading factor decreases
the maximum achievable SINR in the network. For example,
when N = 2 and K/τ increases from 2 to 8, the maximum
achievable SINR reduces from 0.1 to 0.03. However, the
impact of increasing N is much larger than the impact of
increasing K/τ . For example, when N increases from 0 to
2, the decrease in maximum achievable SINR is comparable
with that when N = 0 and K/τ increases from 2 to 8.
This performance comparison highlights the degradation in
the achievable SINR caused by Eves.
B. Impact of PC Attack on Achievable SINRs
In this subsection, we examine the impact of the PC attack
on the achievable SINR for Bobs in the l-th cell of the
network, when Alicel is equipped with a large but finite
number of antennas. In this subsection, we assume that the
SINR requirements for all Bobs in the network are given as
γ1 = [0.91, 0.74, 0.64, 0.23] and γ2 = [0.94, 0.82, 0.45, 0.20].
Accordingly, we use the user capacity-achieving pilot se-
quence design to obtain pilot sequences for all Bobs in the
network. We highlight that the SINR requirements lie inside
the user capacity region given by (12), when N = 0.
We first examine the impact of increasing the transmit power
of Evein, p¯in, on the achievable SINR. We highlight that p¯in
cannot exceed a certain threshold, which depends on network
conditions, the power resource available at Even, and the
detection capabilities of Alice. Fig. 6 depicts the achievable
SINR of Bob11, θ¯11,800, versus p¯in for different values of N .
In this figure, we assume that Alicel is equipped with 800
antennas and p¯in must satisfy the constraint given by (19). We
find that increasing p¯in reduces θ¯11,800. Moreover, we find that
the active attack strategy is able to reduce θ¯11,800 by 23.8%
when p¯in = 0 dB, which implies that p¯in is approximately
49% of the maximum transmit power of Bobs in the network.
Importantly, we observe the reduction in θ¯11,800 even when
the transmit power is very small, e.g., p¯in = −20 dB, when
Fig. 7. The achievable SINR θ¯11,M versus the number of antennas at the
BS for different number of Eves in the network.
N = 1. As such, the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence
design is adversely affected by the active attack even when
the attacker has limited resources. Throughout the remainder
of this subsection, we assume that p¯in = 0 dB.
We next examine the impact of the active attack strategy
employed by Eves on the achievable SINR for Bob11. Fig. 7
depicts θ¯11,M versus the number of antennas at Alicel for
different values of N . This figure highlights the severity of
the active attack strategy on the network performance. For
example, Bob11 can no longer satisfy its SINR requirements
even when there is one Eve in the network. Importantly, when
M = 500 and N = 1, the achievable SINR θ¯11,M reduces
from 0.91 to 0.85, which is equivalent to 10.9% reduction
in the achievable SINR. Consequently, θ¯11,M can no longer
be satisfied even with an unlimited number of antennas at
the BS. Furthermore, we find that θ¯11,M reduces by 23.08%
when N = 3 as compared to θ¯11,M when N = 0. As such, the
active attack strategy effectively reduces the achievable SINR
of Bobs in the network where the pilot sequences are designed
by using the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence design.
Finally, we examine the impact of active attack on achiev-
able SINR of Bobs in the network. We highlight that the
pilot sequences used in the network are correlated. As such,
increased PC that is caused by the active attack has the
potential to affect the achievable SINR of more than one Bob
in the network. Fig. 8 depicts the achievable SINR for Bob11,
Bob12, Bob13, and Bob14. In this simulation, the solid curves
are obtained from (8) when N = 0 and dashed curves are
obtained from (8) when N = 3. We find that the active
attack strategy reduces the achievable SINR for all Bobs in
the network except for Bob12. Notably, the achievable SINR
for Bob11 is significantly reduced because its pilot sequence
is known to Eves. We note that the active attack strategy not
only impacts the SINR requirements for the Bobs whose pilot
sequence is known to Eves but impacts the achievable SINR
of other Bobs. We highlight that the use of correlated pilots is
the main cause of this impact. Thus, correlated pilots design
such as the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence design may
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Fig. 8. The achievable SINR θ¯11,M , θ¯12,M , θ¯13,M , and θ¯14,M versus the
number of antennas for N = 0 and N = 3.
be more suitable for a network without Eves. Furthermore, we
note that the difference between the achievable SINR without
and with Eves in the network decreases as M increases. For
example, when M = 100, the achievable SINR for Bob11
reduces 36.81% due to active attack. However, when M = 800
the achievable SINR for Bob1 reduces 18.69% due to active
attack. This behaviour is due to the large array gain provided
by massive MIMO, which indicates the potential benefit of
using massive MIMO in a network vulnerable to active attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an active attacking strategy on
the user capacity-achieving pilot sequence design in a massive
MIMO network, where correlated pilots are assigned to all
the users in the network. To this end, we first identified the
potential vulnerabilities in the user capacity-achieving pilot
sequence design which produces correlated pilots for all the
users in the network. Based on the known structure of the
correlated pilot set, we then designed an active attacking
strategy for increasing PC in the massive MIMO network. We
demonstrated that the SINR requirements for all the users in
the network are no longer guaranteed in the presence of active
attacker(s) using our proposed strategy. The degradation in
network performance is due to the fact that the user capacity
region is significantly reduced by active attackers. Specifically,
the SINR requirements for the worst-affected users by active
attackers may not be satisfied even with an infinite number of
antennas at the BS. We concluded that the use of correlated
pilots make the massive MIMO network prone to active attack
due to increased PC.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
In this appendix, we ascertain the impact of Eves’ PC attack
on the user capacity of the network. Assuming that Alicel is
equipped with a large number of antennas, i.e., M →∞, and
pijβlki ≤ 1 we obtain from (8) that
θ¯lk,∞ =
Plk
α¯lk
∑
(i,j)6=(l,k)
|ρlkij |2Pij
α¯ij
=
Plk
α¯lk
∑
i,j
|ρlkij |2Pij
α¯ij
− Plk
. (28)
We highlight that the downlink achievable SINR with an
infinite number of antennas θ¯lk,∞, is always greater than or
equal to the downlink achievable SINR with a finite number
of antennas M , θlk,M . From (4) and (10), we obtain
α¯lk = αlk + αˆ11lk + · · ·+ αˆinlk + · · ·+ αˆLNlk, (29)
where αˆinlk = p¯inβ¯inlρ2inlk and p¯n > 0. Using (28) and (29),
we obtain
θ¯lk,∞ =
Plk
(αlk + αˆ11lk + · · ·+ αˆLNlk)
∑
i,j
|ρlkij |2Pij
α¯ij
− Plk
,
=
Plk
(αlk + · · ·+ αˆLNlk) tr
(
sTlkSPA¯S
T slk
)− Plk ,
(30)
where we define the matrices S = [S1, · · · ,Sl, · · · ,SL],
P = diag [P1, · · · ,Pl, · · · ,PL], and A¯ =
diag
[
A¯1, · · · , A¯l, · · · , A¯L
]
. Furthermore, we define
Sl = [sl1, sl2, · · · , slK ], Pl = diag [pl1, pl2, · · · , plK ],
and A¯l = diag
[
1
α¯l1
, 1α¯l2 , · · · , 1α¯lK
]
respectively. From (30),
we obtain∑
l,k
1 + θ¯lk,∞
θ¯lk,∞
=
∑
l,k
(αlk + · · ·+ αˆLNlk) tr
(
sTlkSPA¯S
T slk
)
Plk
= tr
(
P−1A−1STSPA¯STS
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
υ1
+ · · ·
+ tr
(
P−1A¯−1LNS
TSPA¯STS
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
υ2
, (31)
where we use the matrix definitions A =
diag[A1, · · · ,Al, · · · ,AL], Al = diag
[
1
αl1
, 1αl2 , · · · , 1αlK
]
, and A¯in is a block diagonal matrix with diagonal entries
given as A¯in = diag[A¯in1, · · · , A¯inl, · · · , A¯inL] and
A¯inl = diag
[
1
αˆinl1
, 1αˆinl2 , · · · , 1αˆinlK
]
. We note that υ2 in
(31) is due to PC attack by EveLN . We next simplify υ1 in
(31) as
υ1 = Ktot +
∑
p,q
p>r
∑
r,s
q>s
(
αrsPpq
α¯pqPrs
+
α¯pqPrs
αrsPpq
)
|ρpqrs|2
≥ Ktot + 2
∑
p,q
p>r
∑
r,s
q>s
|ρpqrs|2
≥ tr (RSRS) , (32)
where RS = STS. Using the eigen decomposition of RS , we
rewrite (32) as
tr (RSRS) =
Ktot∑
i=1
λ2i =
(
∑τ
i=1 λi)
2
τ
=
K2tot
τ
, (33)
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where λi is the i-th eigen value of RS . From (32) and (34),
we obtain
υ1 ≥ K
2
tot
τ
. (34)
Following the same procedure, we obtain
υ2 ≥ K
2
tot
τ
. (35)
Finally, substituting (34) and (35) in (31), we obtain the bound
on the user capacity of the massive MIMO network in the
presence of N Eves as∑
l,k
1 + θ¯lk,∞
θ¯lk,∞
≥ (LN + 1)K
2
tot
τ
. (36)
Noting the θ¯lk,∞ ≥ γlk, we then rewrite (36) as
L∑
l=1
K∑
k=1
1 + γlk
γlk
≥ (LN + 1)K
2
tot
τ
, (37)
which is then rearranged to obtain (11).
REFERENCES
[1] N. Akbar and S. Yan, “Active attack on user load achieving pilot design
in massive MIMO networks,” in Proc. IEEE Globecom Workshops (GC
Wkshps), Singapore, Dec. 2017, pp. 1–6.
[2] T. L. Marzetta, E. G. Larsson, H. Yang, and H. Q. Ngo, “Fundamentals
of massive MIMO”, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016.
[3] E. Bjo¨rnson, J. Hoydis, M. Kountouris, and M. Debbah, “Massive
MIMO systems with non-ideal hardware: Energy efficiency, estimation,
and capacity limits,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 60, no. 11, pp. 7112–
7139, Nov. 2014.
[4] N. Akbar, E. Bjo¨rnson, E. G. Larsson, and N. Yang, “Downlink power
control in massive MIMO networks with distributed antenna arrays,” in
Proc. IEEE Intl. Conf. Commun. (ICC), Kansas City, MO, May 2018,
pp. 1–6.
[5] T. Narasimhan and A. Chockalingam, “Channel hardening-exploiting
message passing (CHEMP) receiver in large-scale MIMO systems,”
IEEE J. Sel. Topics Signal Process., vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 847–860, Oct.
2014.
[6] S. Malkowsky, J. Vieira, L. Liu, P. Harris, K. Nieman, N. Kundargi,
I. C. Wong, F. Tufvesson, V. O¨wall, and O. Edfors, “The world’s
first real-time testbed for massive MIMO: Design, implementation, and
validation,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 9073–9088, May 2017.
[7] X. Zhang and E. W. Knightly, “Pilot distortion attack and zero-startup-
cost detection in massive MIMO network: From analysis to experi-
ments,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Foren. Sec., vol. 13, no. 12, pp. 3094–3107,
Dec. 2018.
[8] A. O. Martinez, P. Popovski, J. O. Nielsen, and E. D. Carvalho,
“Experimental study of the benefits of a second antenna at the user
side in a massive MIMO system,” IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 2899–2907,
Dec. 2017.
[9] O. Elijah, C. Y. Leow, T. A. Rahman, S. Nunoo, and S. Z. Iliya,
“A comprehensive survey of PC in massive MIMO–5G system,” IEEE
Commun. Surveys & Tuts., vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 905–923, Nov. 2015.
[10] J. Jose, A. Ashikhmin, T. Marzetta, and S. Vishwanath, “Pilot contami-
nation and precoding in multi-cell TDD systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless
Commun., vol. 10, no. 8, pp. 2640–2651, Aug. 2011.
[11] N. Akbar, N. Yang, P. Sadeghi, and R. A. Kennedy, “Multi-cell multiuser
massive MIMO networks: User capacity analysis and pilot design,” IEEE
Trans. Commun., vol. 64, no. 12, pp. 5064–5077, Dec. 2016.
[12] N. Akbar, N. Yang, P. Sadeghi, and R. A. Kennedy, “User load analysis
and pilot sequence design for multi-cell massive MIMO networks,” in
Proc. IEEE Global Commun. Conf. (Globecom), Washington, DC, Dec.
2016, pp. 1–6.
[13] J.-C. Shen, J. Zhang, and K. Letaief, “Downlink user capacity of massive
MIMO under pilot contamination,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.,
vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 3183–3193, Jun. 2015.
[14] L. Lu, G. Y. Li, A. L. Swindlehurst, A. Ashikhmin, and Z. Rui, “An
overview of massive MIMO: Benefits and challenges,” IEEE J. Sel.
Topics Signal Process., vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 742–758, Oct. 2014.
[15] F. Fernandes, A. Ashikhmin, and T. Marzetta, “Inter-cell interference in
noncooperative TDD large scale antenna systems,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas
Commun., vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 192–201, Feb. 2013.
[16] X. Zhu, Z. Wang, L. Dai, and C. Qian, “Smart pilot assignment for
massive MIMO,” IEEE Commun. Lett., vol. 19, no. 9, pp. 1644–1647,
Sep. 2015.
[17] H. Ahmadi, A. Farhang, N. Marchetti, and A. MacKenzie, “A game
theoretic approach for pilot contamination avoidance in massive MIMO,”
IEEE ireless Commun. Lett., vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 12–15, Feb. 2016.
[18] A. Ashikhmin, L. Li, and T. L. Marzetta, “Interference reduction in
multi-cell massive MIMO systems with large-scale fading precoding,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 64, no. 9, pp. 6340–6361, Sep. 2018.
[19] N. Akbar, S. Yan, N. Yang, and J. Yuan, “Location-aware pilot allocation
in multicell multiuser massive MIMO networks,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Tech.,
vol. 67, no. 8, pp. 7774–7778, Aug. 2018.
[20] H. Yin, D. Gesbert, M. Filippou, and Y. Liu, “A coordinated approach
to channel estimation in large-scale multiple-antenna systems,” IEEE J.
Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 31, no. 2, pp. 264–273, Feb. 2013.
[21] R. Muller, L. Cottatellucci, and M. Vehkapera, “Blind pilot decontami-
nation,” IEEE J. Sel. Topics Signal Process., vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 773–786,
Oct. 2014.
[22] D. Hu, L. He, and X. Wang, “Semi-blind pilot decontamination for
massive MIMO systems,” IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun., vol. 15, no. 1,
pp. 525–536, Jan. 2016.
[23] D. Kapetanovic, G. Zheng, and F. Rusek, “Physical layer security for
massive MIMO: An overview on passive eavesdropping and active
attacks,” IEEE Commun. Mag, vol. 53, no. 6, pp. 21–27, Jun. 2015.
[24] X. Zhou, B. Maham, and A. Hjørungnes, “Pilot contamination for active
eavesdropping,” IEEE Trans. on Wireless Commun., vol. 11, no. 3,
pp. 903–907, Mar. 2012.
[25] J. K. Tugnait, “Self-contamination for detection of pilot contamination
attack in multiple antenna systems,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett.,
vol. 4, no. 5, pp. 525–528, Oct. 2015.
[26] J. K. Tugnait, “Pilot spoofing attack detection and countermeasure,”
IEEE Trans. Commun., vol. 66, no. 5, pp. 2093–2106, May 2018.
[27] H. Wang, K. Huang, and T. A. Tsiftsis, “Multiple antennas secure
transmission under pilot spoofing and jamming attack,” IEEE J. Sel.
Areas Commun., vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 860–876, Apr. 2018.
[28] K. Huang, H. Wang, Y. Wu, and R. Schober, “Pilot spoofing attack by
multiple eavesdroppers,” IEEE Trans. on Wireless Commun., vol. 17,
no. 10, pp. 6433–6447, Oct. 2018.
[29] J. Chen, H. Chen, H. Zhang, and F. Zhao, “Spectral-energy efficiency
tradeoff in relay-aided massive MIMO cellular networks with pilot
contamination,” IEEE Access, vol. 4, pp. 5234–5242, Jul. 2016.
[30] T. C. Mai, H. Q. Ngo, M. Egan, and T. .Q. Duong, “Pilot power control
for cell-free massive MIMO,” IEEE Trans. Veh. Technol., Aug. 2018.
(Early Access)
[31] Q. Zhang, S. Jin, M. McKay, D. Morales-Jimenez, and H. Zhu, “Power
allocation schemes for multicell massive MIMO systems,” IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun., vol. 14, no. 11, pp. 5941–5955, Nov. 2015.
[32] T. T. Do, H. Q. Ngo, T. Q. Duong, T. J. Oechtering, and M. Skoglund,
“Massive MIMO pilot retransmission strategies for robustification
against jamming,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 58–
61, Feb. 2017.
[33] H. Pirzadeh, S. M. Razavizadeh, and E. Bjo¨rnson, “Subverting massive
MIMO by smart jamming,” IEEE Wireless Commun. Lett., vol. 5, no. 1,
pp. 20–23, Feb. 2016.
[34] G. H. Hardy, J. E. Littlewood, and G. Po´lya, Inequalities, Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1954.
[35] P. Viswanath and V. Anantharam, “Optimal sequences and sum capacity
of synchronous CDMA systems,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 45, no. 6,
pp. 1984–1991, Sep. 1999.
[36] L. Welch, “Lower bounds on the maximum cross correlation of signals
(corresp.),” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 397–399, May
1974.
[37] Y. Wu, R. Schober, D. W. K. Ng, C. Xiao, and G. Caire, “Secure
massive MIMO transmission with an active eavesdropper,” IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory, vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 3880–3900, Jul. 2016.
[38] X. Tian, M. Li, and Q. Liu, ”Random-training-assisted pilot spoofing
detection and security enhancement,” IEEE Access, vol. 5, pp. 27384-
27399, Dec. 2017.
AKBAR et al.:ON THE PILOT CONTAMINATION ATTACK IN MULTI-CELL MULTIUSER MASSIVE MIMO NETWORKS 13
Noman Akbar (S15–M’20) received the B.E. de-
gree in electrical (telecommunication) engineering
from the National University of Sciences and Tech-
nology (NUST), Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in 2012, the
M.S. degree in computer engineering from Kyung
Hee University, Suwon, South Korea, in 2015, and
the Ph.D. degree in electrical engineering from the
Australian National University, Canberra, Australia,
in 2018. From 2012 to 2013, he was a Researcher
with the NUST School of Electrical Engineering
and Computer Science. From 2013 to 2015, he was
with the Haptics Laboratory, Kyung Hee University, Suwon, South Korea,
as a Research Assistant. He is currently a Postdoctoral Research Fellow
with the Research School of Electrical, Energy and Materials Engineering,
Australian National University, Canberra, Australia. He received the Best
Paper Award from IEEE GlobeCOM in 2016. His research interests include
signal processing for audio and wireless communications.
Shihao Yan (S11–M15) received the B.S. degree in
communication engineering and the M.S. degree in
communication and information systems from Shan-
dong University, Jinan, China, in 2009 and 2012,
respectively, and the Ph.D. degree in electrical engi-
neering from the University of New South Wales,
Sydney, NSW, Australia, in 2015. From 2015 to
2017, he was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the
Research School of Engineering, Australian National
University, Canberra, ACT, Australia. He is currently
a University Research Fellow with the School of
Engineering, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia. His current
research interests are in the areas of wireless communications and statistical
signal processing, including physical layer security, covert communications,
and location spoofing detection.
Asad Masood Khattak is an Associate Professor
at the College of Technological Innovation, Zayed
University in Abu Dhabi, UAE that he joined in
August 2014. He received his M.S. in Information
Technology from National University of Sciences
and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan in
2008 and received his Ph.D. degree in Computer
Engineering from Kyung Hee University, South Ko-
rea in 2012. He worked as Post-Doctoral Fellow at
Department of Computer Engineering, Kyung Hee
University, South Korea and later joined the same
college as Assistant Professor. He is currently leading three research projects,
collaborating in four research projects, and has successfully completed five re-
search projects in the fields of Data Curation, Context-aware Computing, IoT,
and Secure Computing. He is an IEEE member and has authored/coauthored
more than 100 journal and conference articles in highly reputed venues. He
is serving as reviewer, program committee member, and guest editor of many
conferences and journals. He has delivered keynote speeches, invited talks,
guest lectures and has delivered short courses in many universities. He and
his team have secured several national and international awards in different
competitions.
Nan Yang (S’09–M’11–SM’18) received the B.S.
degree in electronics from China Agricultural Uni-
versity in 2005, and the M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in
electronic engineering from the Beijing Institute of
Technology in 2007 and 2011, respectively. He has
been with the Research School of Electrical, Energy
and Materials Engineering at the Australian National
University since July 2014, where he currently works
as a Senior Lecturer. Prior to this, he was a Post-
doctoral Research Fellow at the University of New
South Wales (2012–2014) and the Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (2010–2012). He received
the IEEE ComSoc Asia-Pacific Outstanding Young Researcher Award in
2014 and the Best Paper Awards from the IEEE GlobeCOM 2016 and
the IEEE VTC 2013-Spring. He also received the Top Editor Award from
the TRANSACTIONS ON EMERGING TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLO-
GIES, the Exemplary Reviewer Awards from the IEEE TRANSACTIONS
ON COMMUNICATIONS, IEEE WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS,
and IEEE COMMUNICATIONS LETTERS, and the Top Reviewer Award
from the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY from 2012
to 2018. He is currently serving in the Editorial Board of the IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, IEEE TRANSACTIONS
ON MOLECULAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND MULTI-SCALE COMMUNICATIONS,
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY, and TRANSACTIONS
ON EMERGING TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES. His general re-
search interests include ultra-reliable low latency communications, millimeter
wave and terahertz communications, massive multi-antenna systems, cyber-
physical security, and molecular communications.
